1 (Case called)

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MR. ZALKIN: Good morning, your Honor, Alexander Zalkin on behalf of plaintiff.

MR. HANTMAN: Good morning, your Honor, Robert Hantman, Hantman & Associates, also for plaintiff.

MS. KAPLAN: Good morning, your Honor, Roberta Kaplan from Kaplan & Company for Columbia University.

MR. JOHNSON: Good morning, your Honor, Darren Johnson from Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison on behalf of defendant Columbia University.

MS. HIRSHMAN: Michelle Hirshman on behalf of Paul Weiss and Columbia University as cocounsel with Kaplan & Company.

THE COURT: Good morning.

Why don't I start with the defense. Who wants to be heard on the motion?

MS. KAPLAN: I would, your Honor.

Your Honor, if I may, I want to begin this morning by acknowledging the circumstances of this case and by repeating the first line of our moving brief which makes note of that fact. We said in that brief that plaintiff's account of the two sexual assaults that she allegedly suffered while a student at Columbia is heartbreaking and indeed it is, your Honor.

To further respect the sensitive nature of the information involved in this case, I placed a telephone call to

my colleague, Alex Zalkin, counsel for plaintiff, Friday afternoon. And on that call I noted the fact that of the exhibits that we filed, Exhibits 2 through 15 were filed under seal for this reason. And both Mr. Zalkin and I agreed not to reference the contents of any of those exhibits in court today since this is an open courtroom open to the public and we want to respect plaintiff's confidentiality and the sensitivity of the issues discussed therein. And with all respect, your Honor, we would hope that you could avoid getting into those details as well in your questions.

Let me now turn to the applicable legal standard since that is obviously what is most relevant today on a motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court first established a private right of action for students alleging violations of Title IX in the case of Davis v. Monroe County from 1999. The Davis case involved a fifth grade girl who was subjected to a prolonged pattern of sexual harassment by the boys in her class and who reported each of those incidents, but the school did nothing in response.

In reversing the lower court decision dismissing the complaint, Justice O'Connor articulated the standard that is applicable here for a Title IX claim on a theory of deliberate indifference, which is the theory that plaintiff is using here. And that standard is as follows: Whether the actions of the educational institution receiving federal funds were clearly

unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.

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clear, even though it sounds like a factual standard, that this

Moreover, your Honor, the Davis court made it very

clearly unreasonable standard is not merely a matter of

evidentiary proof but is actually an independent pleading

standard. The Supreme Court was very clear in that opinion

that deliberate indifference cases can and should be dismissed

on the pleadings. Justice O'Connor, in fact, encouraged

district courts to do so at 649 of that opinion when she

explained that there was no reason why a court on a motion to

dismiss in an appropriate case should not be able to identify a

response as not clearly unreasonable as a matter of law.

Here, plaintiff concedes that she did not formally report the two alleged sexual assaults to Columbia until August 2016, 10 months after the first alleged assault occurred. And she strongly objected during that period to any investigation taking place before that time. In fact, on multiple occasions plaintiff stated emphatically that she did not want to report her assaults, that she did not want to start an investigation, that she wanted to preserve her confidentiality, and that she did not want to provide Columbia with any information necessary to identify her assailants. As soon as plaintiff changed her mind, which happened during the summer after her freshman year, and did decide to make a formal report, Columbia acted promptly to investigate.

THE COURT: Remind me on which occasions she indicated that she did not want them to investigate.

MS. KAPLAN: She acknowledges in her complaint that she did not formally report it until that summer.

THE COURT: I understand that.

MS. KAPLAN: At paragraph 59, I believe it is, of the complaint, your Honor, she told them in January '16, paragraph 52, that she did not want to officially report her sexual assaults.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. You said that was --

MS. KAPLAN: Paragraph 52, your Honor, last sentence.

THE COURT: It doesn't have a date.

MS. KAPLAN: That was January 2016. The next paragraph is February 2016.

THE COURT: And remind me under what context that conversation --

MS. KAPLAN: In the previous paragraph it sets forth the context. It does say it's January 2016, paragraph 51. She received a call from Adrienne Blount, a case manager at Columbia Student Conduct and Community Standards Office. I can read the rest of the paragraph, your Honor, but the context is there had been a university-wide survey that plaintiff filled out. She says it was anonymous. Actually, people were named in filling it out. In that survey, which actually had nothing to do with these issues, she reported that she had been

assaulted. Columbia immediately followed up with a call from Ms. Blount and on that call she even concedes that she told Blount that she did not wish to officially report her sexual assault, paragraph 52.

THE COURT: When was the conversation that you've alluded to when you quoted her saying that she didn't want to be contacted again about this?

MS. KAPLAN: That is that conversation, your Honor, and that's in the exhibits that I said that I would not refer to.

THE COURT: We are talking about the Blount conversation.

MS. KAPLAN: Yes.

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THE COURT: That's January of 2016.

MS. KAPLAN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Are we talking about any other indication that she did not want to investigate either before January or after January?

MS. KAPLAN: Well, she does allege in her complaint -- I am going to try to limit this to things that are not in the exhibits for now because I said I would.

In her complaint she alleges a number of times in which she had contacts with Columbia personnel. She talks about speaking to a nurse, for example, and she makes an accusation that that nurse improperly referred to her as a

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between October 2015 and December 2015?

MS. KAPLAN: Your Honor, I thought you might ask that question. I actually prepared a chart. I have not showed it to my adversary. Can I show it to my adversary and then, if he concedes, show it to your Honor?

1 THE COURT: Sure.

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MS. KAPLAN: May I approach, your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. KAPLAN: Your Honor, the two alleged assaults show up here on October 5 and December 14, 2015. You'll see that there is a third column, type of resource, and that's very key because under both DOE laws and regulations and Columbia's own policies, certain people that plaintiff spoke to, like the nurse on the sexual violence hotline, have an obligation, if plaintiff so requests, which she did here, to keep any information she can base it on confidential.

We have noted in the third column over which contacts were confidential resources pursuant to the guidelines and pursuant to, and I'll talk about this more, Columbia's policies with respect to sexual assault on campus and which were not, and then I am going to focus in quite specifically on the two that were not, which plaintiff focuses on in her brief and in her complaint.

THE COURT: We have the October 5 first alleged assault on your chart and then on October 12 you say that she went to the medical service, but between October 5 and October 12, there was no either report or medical treatment sought with regard to the first.

MS. KAPLAN: That's as far as we know, your Honor, and as far as plaintiff alleges, yes.

advisor.

MS KARLAN: You I am going to gome back to that

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MS. KAPLAN: Yes. I am going to come back to that, your Honor, because there are only two times, as I understand

her argument, that she says she said something that would have constituted the kind of notice or report that should have provoked Columbia to nevertheless do something, frankly, against her wishes, and those two are the discussion with her academic advisor that you just referred to and a later conversation with the executive vice-president for University Life.

THE COURT: But you don't claim the discussion with the advisor was a discussion about the assault.

MS. KAPLAN: Correct.

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THE COURT: You say that that was a discussion about some academic accommodation.

MS. KAPLAN: Correct. I can tell you what she says in her complaint, your Honor, and I think her words are very carefully chosen. And in her complaint the most she says about this meeting is that she strongly alluded, strongly alluded to that something had happened. I believe that's paragraph 22, your Honor. Let me doublecheck. No. I apologize. That's paragraph 39, your Honor.

THE COURT: Without explicitly saying that she was raped, plaintiff strongly alluded to the advisor that plaintiff had been raped.

MS. KAPLAN: I want to keep to my promise to counsel. We have provided the documentation on that in the exhibits filed under seal.

THE COURT: Give me a little bit more detail about this December 3 meeting with the student advocate. Is this some kind of forum?

MS. KAPLAN: Yes.

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THE COURT: Some kind of faculty/student discussion group? How do you characterize this?

MS. KAPLAN: Let me give you the context. The executive vice-president for the University Life at Columbia is a person who has been charged officially with dealing with this issue, among other issues on campus, including Columbia's Title IX policies and procedures and how Columbia deals with that and improvements, what can be done. Columbia revises its policies almost every year, things like that. That is among the policies that the executive vice-president for student life is responsible for.

And plaintiff, and I think you can see this in her complaint, is an advocate in this group. The main group at Columbia is called No Red Tape, student activists about sexual assaults on campus, and she is very involved in that group. There was a meeting. They have periodic meetings between a whole bunch of students and the executive vice-president of University Life, in which plaintiff attended, to discuss precisely those issues. There, for lack of a fancier term, their complaint, their beefs with the way Columbia handles these issues on campus —

H Case 1:17-cv-02032-GBD Document 41 Filed 08/16/17 Page 12 of 99 12 1 THE COURT: How large a meeting is this? 2 MS. KAPLAN: My understanding, there were several 3 students there, and she doesn't contest that. 4 THE COURT: So at this meeting --5 MS. KAPLAN: She says in her complaint several other 6 student advocacy organization members. Paragraph 44, your 7 Honor. 8 THE COURT: At this meeting she indicated that she had 9 been raped? 10 MS. KAPLAN: Correct. That's what she alleges. 11 THE COURT: That was December 3. At that point she would be referring to the October 5. 12 13 MS. KAPLAN: Correct, your Honor. Logically, that's 14 what she would have meant. 15 THE COURT: Then December 14 was the second assault. 16 MS. KAPLAN: Correct, your Honor. 17 THE COURT: And on the next day she goes to St. Luke's 18 Hospital for treatment of her injuries and rape kit. 19 MS. KAPLAN: Correct, your Honor. 20 THE COURT: Now, let's get back to where you started, 21 the January 19 phone call. The January 19 phone call was a 22 phone call initiated by Ms. Blount, the case manager. 2.3 MS. KAPLAN: Correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: Because she saw a survey that was

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submitted.

1 MS. KAPLAN: Um-hum.

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THE COURT: And that survey was submitted relative to what? Is that in conjunction with this December 3 meeting?

MS. KAPLAN: Totally unrelated. It was a university-wide survey. It was actually, as I understand it, in connection with Columbia's accreditation process. It had nothing to do with Title IX or sexual assaults on campus.

THE COURT: When was this survey filled out?

MS. KAPLAN: Shortly before that, your Honor. I can get you the date.

THE COURT: You think in January?

MS. KAPLAN: Yeah. That's my understanding.

THE COURT: Ms. Blount sees the survey.

MS. KAPLAN: And that, from Columbia's perspective, her name is on the survey. She is actually incorrect in alleging here that it was anonymous. Her name actually was on it. That's the first time that Columbia had a nonconfidential communication to Columbia specifically alleging these assaults. I can get back to the executive vice-president meeting and why that doesn't count in a second.

In response, Columbia followed up immediately with this call.

THE COURT: They called her, Ms. Blount called her, and the plaintiff had described which incident, both incidents?

MS. KAPLAN: It says sexual assaults. Again, I'm

trying not to get into the exhibits, but there is no description.

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THE COURT: It doesn't say, I was assaulted on October 5 and/or December 4. Is there some kind of box that's checked?

MS. KAPLAN: No. She actually wrote it in because

it's not pertinent to anything that's in this -
THE COURT: The information she provided on the survey

was that she had been -- what was described? What information did she provide then?

MS. KAPLAN: That she had been sexually assaulted.

THE COURT: They contacted her in response to this information on the survey, Ms. Blount.

MS. KAPLAN: Correct.

THE COURT: In that conversation, on January 19, that was when she indicated that she did not want to officially report the assaults.

MS. KAPLAN: Correct. That's based on her allegation.

THE COURT: She also indicated to them that she did not want them to contact her again about those assaults?

MS. KAPLAN: That's correct, your Honor. That's based on the document that we submitted. What she says is that she didn't want them to contact her ever again.

THE COURT: And then the next communication about these incidents was not until August 5, when she made a formal what? What did she do?

1 MS. KAPLAN: She made a formal report.

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THE COURT: I don't know what that means.

MS. KAPLAN: I believe it was by e-mail. Again, I'm trying to avoid the exhibits. She did make a formal communication to Columbia that she now wanted to formally report.

THE COURT: I'm just trying to understand. That triggers what? What does a formal report mean and --

MS. KAPLAN: What that meant, given this context, is that not only did she want Columbia to go forward with an investigation, but, critically, she was willing to cooperate with that investigation. This was very important because the first time Columbia is aware of any of the details, your Honor just referred to that, any of the details of what she alleges happened to her, where it happened, how it happened, etc., was not until that summer, late that summer, and then her official interview happens pretty soon after she comes back to campus in September.

THE COURT: The thing you don't have on this chart is that they began an investigation on September 8.

MS. KAPLAN: Yes, I believe that's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: Now we are talking about 2016. And that investigation entailed what?

MS. KAPLAN: Interviewing plaintiff. As I recall,

there was a request to speak to others who might be witnesses or might have information. She said that there were no such people and she did not want her roommates to be contacted. There are some allegations about some evidence, some notes that she alleges the assailant posted in the dorm and they asked for those notes and she told them she had thrown them away.

There is some other evidence -- again, I'm trying to avoid any details here, and I apologize, your Honor -- about how the second assault was conducted, and they asked if she had any of those things and she was told that, no, she had thrown -- she told them that, no, she had thrown all those away.

They looked at the swipe records for people who had swiped into the dorms during the relevant periods. One of the problems here, your Honor, is that there are three dorms that are all interconnected, so anyone could come into any one of the three dorms and it get access to where her suite was.

There were thousands of entries on those forms.

The description that she gave of her assailant, which is in the complaint, your Honor, is that he had wavy hair, short, wavy, dark hair and was somewhere in the nature of five foot six to six feet tall and that's all she could describe. So given that information, there was really nothing that could be done with the swipe records because that's too little detail to try to identify 3,000 people on swipe records. And the

video of the thing that she seems to have been most concerned, most upset about, is that the video of people going into the dorms by that point had been erased, so there was -- not erased, but written over, so there was no video.

THE COURT: What's the retention policy on that, three months, six months?

MS. KAPLAN: I don't know the retention period, but it was past the retention period.

THE COURT: I have also --

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MS. KAPLAN: I'm sad to say, your Honor, that with respect to these alleged assaults, assuming they occurred, that the person was not able to be found, given what she could provide and given the lapse in time.

THE COURT: So I also have, after the formal report on August 5, an investigation was initiated September 8.

MS. KAPLAN: Yes. I think that's when she came and had the first interview.

THE COURT: And on September 9 she asked that locks be placed on her suite.

MS. KAPLAN: Locks, yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And then on September 16 Columbia offered to put the locks on the suite or give an off-campus apartment.

MS. KAPLAN: That's correct, your Honor. And she chose to have the locks on her suite.

THE COURT: Those were done when?

18 H&S 17-cv-02032-GBD Document 41 Filed 08/16/17 Page 18 of 99 I think promptly thereafter. I don't see 1 MS. KAPLAN: 2 any allegation from her that there was some undue delay on that 3 point. 4 THE COURT: Then October 17 the report was completed, 5 the investigative report. MS. KAPLAN: Yes, your Honor. 6 7 THE COURT: Do I have that right? 8 I have also that there was some sort of housing 9 accommodation on December 9. Was that an off-campus apartment 10 or lock on the suite? MS. KAPLAN: I don't know, your Honor, but I can check 11 while my adversary is speaking. 12 THE COURT: I'm referencing paragraph 67 of the 13 14 complaint. 15 MS. KAPLAN: I don't think Columbia -- I can't give you the details, but I don't think we would deny that she 16 17 requested the housing accommodation as it says here on 18 September 9. She was given the housing accommodation. I don't

have the details about what that was, your Honor. I apologize.

THE COURT: Go ahead. Continue.

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MS. KAPLAN: Given kind of just what we went through, your Honor, the chronology that your Honor helpfully outlined, we believe that this case, while, as I said, heartbreaking, presents a narrow question, actually, that we believe is fully capable of being resolved by this Court on this motion to

dismiss: Mainly, does the university act in a manner that could possibly be construed as clearly unreasonable when it respects a college student's repeated knowing unambiguous requests and refusals, either for the university to investigate or to cooperate with such investigation and indeed in circumstances where any meaningful investigation would have been impossible without the student's cooperation.

We believe, your Honor, that the only answer to this question is no. Given the facts as pleaded in the complaint, it could not have been clearly unreasonable for Columbia to respect plaintiff's wishes that she did not want to report the alleged assault or for there to be an investigation.

Indeed, the fact that Columbia did conduct such an investigation almost as soon as plaintiff reported it, as plaintiff concedes, and we looked at those paragraphs, paragraph 56 and 58, is itself proof that it was not deliberately indifferent to her needs.

In fact, I think it's important in this case, your Honor, to take a step back and try to eliminate the benefit of hindsight. It is important to understand that without plaintiff being willing to disclose the details of the alleged assaults, as she did not do until August 2016, it was all but impossible for Columbia to conduct a meaningful investigation or to know what happened, how it happened or where it happened and, therefore, there is no way that Columbia's conduct could

be clearly unreasonable under the circumstances.

Let me kind of go through the underlying, if I could your Honor, the DOE, the federal law and guidance and why Columbia has these policies and why they exist.

The federal guidance from the DOE office of civil rights, OCR, repeatedly emphasizes the importance of honoring a student's refusal to disclose a sexual assault or to participate in an investigation. Columbia's policies mirror this guidance, as they must, as a recipient of federal funds, and there are strong public policy considerations underlying these policies as well.

Let me start with the federal guidelines. They come from two sources: The dear colleague letter from 2011 and the questions and answers on Title IX and sexual violence from 2014, both of which plaintiff actually attached to her complaint.

The dear colleague letter from 2011 says as follows:
Schools should inform and obtain consent from the complainant
before beginning an investigation. If the complainant requests
confidentiality or asks that the complaint not be pursued, the
school should take all reasonable steps to investigate and
respond to the complaint consistent with the request for
confidentiality or request not to pursue an investigation. If
a complainant insists that his or her name or other
identifiable information not be disclosed, the school should

limited.

inform the claimant that its ability to respond may be limited.

Similarly, in the questions and answers from 2014, the DOE said as follows: OCR strongly supports a student's interest in confidentiality in cases involving sexual violence. There are situations in which a school must override a student's request for confidentiality in order to meet its Title IX obligations. However, these instances will be

Let me turn, your Honor, now, if I may, to Columbia's policies, which, as I said, mirror this federal guidance.

Columbia's policies say the following: If a student wishes to maintain confidentiality, a nonconfidential resource will direct the student to confidential resources, which is some of those early communications that we talked about, which will not report without the student's permission. A student may choose to make a full report or request confidentiality as he or she determines. That's at page 9 of the Columbia policies.

Same page: A student who reports gender-based misconduct to the Columbia's gender-based misconduct office can request that the office not disclose his or her identity to anyone else, including the person who allegedly committed the misconduct. Such a request may limit the ability to investigate and respond.

Let me turn to the reasons why these policies I just read to your Honor exist. The reason, and I am going to tell

you that this comes from federal guidance, is that the policy makers and the Federal Government have concluded that the interests of a student who has been victimized or allegedly victimized in confidentiality has to be of utmost concern.

Here is what the OCR guidance said. It says: A school should be aware that disregarding requests for confidentiality can have a chilling effect and discourage other students from reporting sexual violence. To improve trust in the process for investigating sexual violence complaints, a school must take steps to protect the complainant as necessary.

Moreover, the student advocacy organization, called No Red Tape, of which plaintiff is a member, emphasizes the goal of empowering survivors and allowing survivors to control the process. Indeed, in its very first statement of values, No Red Tape states that members of firm actively support every survivor's right to seek justice in healing in the way that they choose. The work we do is always centered on the needs and experiences of survivors themselves.

Finally, your Honor, we cited in our brief, plaintiff herself wrote a blog post that she published on Huffington Post on June 6, 2016, so the same summer that she changed her mind and formally reported a month or so later, the blog post is called Why We Don't Report It. And she says, with respect to her own decision, I don't report it because it's not best for me. Reporting is detrimental to my well-being and I have no

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obligations to do anything after an assault that doesn't have my best interests and only my best interests at heart.

Your Honor, the fundamental premise or core of plaintiff's thesis in this case is that in order for this case to proceed is that somehow Columbia had an obligation under Title IX to override plaintiff's wishes. That on its own would be quite a hurdle for your Honor for her to make, without the federal guidance and policies that make it very clear that when a complainant takes the kind of position that this plaintiff took, there is grave concern about protecting that person's confidentiality and not pushing a complainant to do something that they are not comfortable with. And then indeed here you have the very practical, what I call the hindsight problem, which is, given the nature of these alleged offenses, without plaintiff being willing to explain to someone at Columbia in a nonconfidential way when it happened, where it happened, how it happened, I would submit, your Honor, as a practical matter there was absolutely nothing that Columbia could have done.

THE COURT: How was that policy communicated to the student body and university community?

MS. KAPLAN: It's communicated in the policies that we attach as Exhibit 1. It's the only nonconfidential exhibit I submitted to your Honor. It's fully available to every student and the students in this No Red Tape group, like plaintiff, were very, very familiar with. If you look at the

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documentation, the confidential documentation that we submitted under seal, she says over and over again how familiar she was with the policies.

THE COURT: Is there any either written or oral communication to the student who indicates that they are reluctant to move forward with an investigation, what the consequences of that reluctance --

MS. KAPLAN: Yes, there is. There is a written policy that says if a student is reluctant to go forward, that's going to have a great -- I just talked about it. We cite it in our brief. That will have an adverse impact on Columbia's ability to investigate, which is exactly what the DOE's regulations state.

THE COURT: If a student in the abstract says I've been sexually assaulted, I want to let you know about it, but I don't want to initiate a formal investigation. What's the student told about what that would mean?

MS. KAPLAN: The policy itself says that that could hamper an investigation.

THE COURT: I know. What does that mean? To hamper an investigation doesn't tell me whether or not you are going to do an investigation.

MS. KAPLAN: She was never told here that Columbia was going to seek to override by Columbia those wishes and, again, as I said, without knowing more, I don't know how Columbia

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could have. You have to contrast the facts alleged here.

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THE COURT: Columbia could have done a number of things, not just for her benefit, but for the benefit of all students. If someone reports a series of sexual assaults at a certain location when obviously Columbia would have some interest, even if that particular student doesn't want their own individual situation to be revealed, the university would have an interest in making sure that that location is a safe location for all the students.

MS. KAPLAN: That didn't happen in a nonconfidential way, your Honor, until August, when Columbia officially started investigating.

THE COURT: It didn't happen, but it's not to say it couldn't have happened.

MS. KAPLAN: It could have happened. If she had sat down with someone in a nonconfidential way and explained what she said in August to Columbia officially, I think Columbia would have probably tried to do something about it.

THE COURT: I assume that if Columbia had gotten reports from 10 different students that they were at a certain location on the campus and they all were sexually assaulted by some individual that they described, that regardless of their wishes to not do an individual formal investigation, Columbia would take its own action to ensure that other students aren't sexually assaulted.

MS. KAPLAN: Absolutely, your Honor. DOE guidance and Columbia's policies provide for that and absolutely in today's world, your Honor — these things make me feel old, I'm sad to say — and a lot of these instances and some of the cases I am going to refer your Honor to, people actually take videotapes of assaults where you have pictures of people and things can be investigated from that and are and, heaven forbid and God forbid, if it was a picture of Columbia or video of Columbia, I am sure we would have done something.

This is where the hindsight problem comes in here.

Until she did that survey where she said there are two assaults without any information about where, how, when, etc., Columbia had no information that it was clear from all the accommodations that she was asking for that something had happened to her, she believed something had happened to her.

But she refused to give Columbia details about that.

This is really one of those scenarios where I am not sure that — Columbia had, A, no way of knowing there was a danger or a potential danger on campus, allegedly; and, B, without that information, I am not sure what they could have done in the circumstances. Surely there are circumstances where public safety concerns would override that based on the notice that was given and what the university knew. The hypothetical your Honor posited certainly would have provoked that. As I said, there is all kinds of cases in the case law

- about Instagram and videotapes and all kind of stuff that I

  honestly can't imagine this world would ever get to that point,

  but it has. In those circumstances of course a college or

  university should follow up.
  - THE COURT: At what point do you say that the university received specifics or detail about the two --
  - MS. KAPLAN: I don't think that's in dispute, your Honor, not until that summer in 2016.
    - THE COURT: Not until that August?
- 10 MS. KAPLAN: No.

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- 11 | THE COURT: Even the survey didn't give any detail --
- MS. KAPLAN: I am going to try to provide the detail,
  your Honor, on the break. As I recall, it just said sexually
- 14 assaulted. It's like a one-sentence handwritten thing.
- THE COURT: You think that those were the words used, sexually assaulted?
- 17 MS. KAPLAN: I believe so. I want to double check.
- THE COURT: And no other description. Did it give the date?
- 20 MS. KAPLAN: No.
- 21 THE COURT: And place where this occurred?
- MS. KAPLAN: No. That I'm sure.
- THE COURT: Just in general made reference to, I had been sexually assaulted.
- 25 MS. KAPLAN: Correct. There is a follow-up in January

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and on the follow-up she says, I don't want to officially report. And you have the document where she says, don't ever contact me.

She does have two contacts. In her case she has two potential communications which she alleges should have provoked Columbia to do the kinds of things your Honor is suggesting. I want to deal with both of those specifically, if I may, your Honor. We have already dealt with them somewhat.

The first is her meeting with her advisor on October 14, 2015. As I said, the complaint in general is carefully worded. There she pleads — the best she is able to plead is she that strongly alluded to advisor. We are living in a world of Iqbal and Twombly and in that regime, your Honor, if she had said to her advisor I was raped, we don't think that it's plausible to assume she would have only alleged that she strongly alluded to. It's almost a suggestion or admission that she not give the advisor enough to know what had happened.

Moreover, the advisor's response -- in other words, under *Iqbal* it would be implausible to read plaintiff's words to mean that she somehow said something much more specific than she alleges in the complaint.

THE COURT: You're merging two different conversations. The October 13 she called the hotline.

MS. KAPLAN: Yes.

THE COURT: She calls the hotline and says what?

MS. KAPLAN: That you have, your Honor, but that was a confidential communication that cannot be reported without her permission, and she doesn't even allege that anything should have been done as a result of that.

THE COURT: The way you characterize it here is incomplete. You say: Plaintiff calls the sexual violence response hotline but does not want to report the alleged assault.

MS. KAPLAN: Right.

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THE COURT: That couldn't have been the conversation.

MS. KAPLAN: No. You have the conversation, your Honor. It's in the exhibits. Exhibit 2, your Honor. Again, we are in an open courtroom.

THE COURT: That's fine. I am just trying to figure out what you're alluding to when you said -- let me just put it to you this way.

MS. KAPLAN: Your Honor, I apologize. It's Exhibit 4.

THE COURT: I assume that what you are doing by this outline is saying that on October 13, she informed them on the hotline that she had been sexually assaulted.

MS. KAPLAN: Yes. But that's a confidential -- that's a rape crisis hotline.

THE COURT: I understand that. I'm just talking from common sense. If she calls the sexual violence response hotline, but does not want to report the alleged assault, one

can only assume that she called the hotline to report the assault. And what you are trying to say is that she called the hotline, but she indicated that she didn't want to report it, so she asked for some sort of confidential consult.

MS. KAPLAN: Your Honor, I'm uncomfortable. If you look at page 5 of the document, she says: I'm not reporting it. But I have an agreement --

THE COURT: I understand that. I'm just going off the chart you gave me. The chart you gave me is a public document and you say the plaintiff calls the sexual violence response hotline but does not want to report the alleged assault. I don't know what kind of conversation that's alluding to because the only thing you say is that she said to them, she didn't want to report --

MS. KAPLAN: Your Honor, she doesn't allege that she reported it on that hotline for purposes of starting any of these proceedings.

THE COURT: I know. You are going to get into a dispute about whether or not -- you say that she has to report it for a purpose and they argue that she just has to report it.

MS. KAPLAN: No, no, no. If she reports it to certain sources, if you look at the chart, who are confidential sources, like rape hotline nurses, those people are not permitted to tell anyone else without her permission and she does not argue otherwise.

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The only two things that she says Columbia should have followed up on -- she is not ever arguing that Columbia should have followed up on this. The only two things that she said Columbia should have followed up on before the summer of 2016 is the meeting with her advisor and the meeting with the executive vice-president of student life, only two things.

That's because, again, she is an expert on these things. She understands and knows that these other things are all statutorily designated as confidential, and she did not give anyone permission to disclose.

THE COURT: Is there something in the complaint that alludes to this sexual violence response hotline conversation?

MS. KAPLAN: I believe there is, your Honor. It's paragraph 32.

THE COURT: Paragraph 32. That's what I alluded to.

This isn't confidential. It says: Plaintiff reported that she had been raped. It says: In response to plaintiff's report that she had been raped. That's what the complaint says. The complaint says that she called the hotline. And then in response to a report that she had been raped she was advised that she could report it to the police. That's what the complaint says.

MS. KAPLAN: Yes. But she does not argue in her papers, nor could she, that that report on October 13 to the sexual violence hotline, which is statutorily protected, could

1 have or would have caused anyone at Columbia to do anything.

THE COURT: That would not have initiated an investigation because the hotline is a confidential hotline.

MS. KAPLAN: Correct.

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THE COURT: And people who call the hotline don't expect you to disclose it to other individuals, not even the university official.

MS. KAPLAN: Correct.

THE COURT: Without your permission.

MS. KAPLAN: You have the transcript of what she said and she clearly did not agree.

THE COURT: Is there a reference to this October 14 call in the complaint?

MS. KAPLAN: Yes. It's paragraph 39.

THE COURT: That's why I'm confused because I can't really reconcile the facts in the complaint as alleged and in your chart as alleged because in the complaint 32 says that she gave a report that she had been raped. That's what it says. It says in response to plaintiff's report that she had been raped.

MS. KAPLAN: That's like the rape crisis hotline.

THE COURT: That is the sexual violence response hotline.

MS. KAPLAN: Right.

THE COURT: She said she had been raped.

H Case 1:17-cv-02032-GBD Document 41 Filed 08/16/17 Page 33 of 99 33 1 MS. KAPLAN: Correct. 2 THE COURT: In 32. 3 MS. KAPLAN: Correct. 4 In 39 it says that she did not explicitly THE COURT: 5 say that she had been raped. MS. KAPLAN: The difference, your Honor, is who she is 6 7 talking to. 8 THE COURT: Am I supposed to read your chart in this 9 complaint as indicating that on October 13, when she called the 10 hotline, she said that she had been raped, but when the person 11 called her the next day, she did not say she had been raped? 12 That's a different communication. MS. KAPLAN: No. THE COURT: I know it's a different communication. 13 14 MS. KAPLAN: The communication with the hotline -- I 15 am going to tell you the exhibit numbers and you can read them. 16 Again, I am going to try to honor my agreement. The call with 17 the hotline is Exhibit 4. The call right after, the 18 communication, the follow-up after the hotline is Exhibit 15. 19 Both of those are confidential people who do not have 20 permission to report what is said to them unless she gives them 21 permission to do so.

THE COURT: I understand that. But I'm trying to understand --

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MS. KAPLAN: That's different from the conversation with her advisor, who was not such a confidential person.

THE COURT: I understand all that perfectly. I'm just 1 saying that on the conversation on the 13th, it says that she 2 3 has reported a rape. In paragraph 32. 4 MS. KAPLAN: Maybe this is the confusion, your Honor. 5 When we use the word report on here, she uses the word herself in the conversation, we report it for purposes of Title IX. 6 7 THE COURT: I understand that. But she said she had 8 been raped. 9 MS. KAPLAN: But it was not a report for purposes of 10 Title IX. 11 THE COURT: I understand that, and I am not debating I am just trying to get the facts. On the 13th she had a 12 13 conversation with someone and in that conversation she 14 indicated on that hotline that she had been raped. 15 MS. KAPLAN: But does not want to report it. 16 THE COURT: Again, don't advocate it right now. 17 just trying to get the facts. She said she had been raped. 18 The next day, when the person called her back to discuss it 19 with her, in paragraph 39, it says that she did not explicitly 20 say --21 MS. KAPLAN: That's a different person, your Honor. 22 There are three people. There is the rape crisis hotline nurse 23 is the first person. Then there is the person who follows up

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academic advisor, who is not part of that process at all. She is just sort of an academic advisor. The academic advisor is the person that she allegedly she strongly alluded to.

THE COURT: This is referencing the academic advisor rather than the staff advocate?

MS. KAPLAN: When you say this, your Honor, what are you referring to?

THE COURT: I'm referring to paragraph 39.

MS. KAPLAN: Paragraph 39 is referring to her academic advisor, correct.

THE COURT: That's not, the staff advocate called me.

MS. KAPLAN: Correct.

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THE COURT: That's what I'm trying to understand.

MS. KAPLAN: I apologize.

THE COURT: The reason why I'm confused is because those are three different calls and you only have two calls on your chart.

MS. KAPLAN: We have all three. They are just on different dates, but we have all three. We have the sexual violence response hotline on October 13, we have the call to Barbacane on October 14.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. KAPLAN: And we have, reaches out to her academic advisor, and you skip a box and go to the next box.

THE COURT: The plaintiff reaches out to her academic

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advisor. That box is the October 14, second conversation with someone different than the staff advocate.

MS. KAPLAN: Different than the nurse. But the first person she alleges she spoke to who was not under confidentiality obligations.

THE COURT: What you are trying to point out is that in the confidential hotline conversation she may have called the hotline and talked to them about a rape. But the day that she spoke to the academic advisor she may have discussed with the staff advocate a rape, but she did not say to the academic advisor that same day that she was raped.

MS. KAPLAN: Correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: You are saying she had the confidential conversation with the hotline, the initial call to the hotline, and then they call back to her where she discusses the rape in confidence with the hotline. But when she reached out to her academic advisor, she did not mention her rape.

MS. KAPLAN: Correct.

THE COURT: I'm trying to understand, in what way was the conversation with the academic advisor a conversation about -- was that just an academic conversation or was that a conversation about her being sexually assaulted?

MS. KAPLAN: It was about accommodations.

THE COURT: That's what I'm trying to say.

Accommodation for what reason?

1 MS. KAPLAN: Turning in papers late, missing classes.

THE COURT: Not accommodation about changing the locks or moving to another  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{--}}$ 

MS. KAPLAN: Correct.

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THE COURT: That's where I'm confused. When you talk about accommodation, mostly we are talking about whether they accommodated her request to put the locks --

MS. KAPLAN: There are two categories, academic and housing.

THE COURT: The academic conversation you say had absolutely nothing to do nor did she disclose that she had been sexually assaulted to the academic --

MS. KAPLAN: She was asking for accommodations. When students ask for accommodations, often they are asking for them because something happened to her.

THE COURT: Not the way you just said. You said something about the paper was due. If I'm in college and I have a late paper, it doesn't have anything to do with a sexual assault. It means I just didn't do my paper. If someone said, my paper is due next Monday, but I can't have it to you until Tuesday, why would anybody think that's a conversation about sexual assault?

MS. KAPLAN: Plaintiff told Columbia when she applied to Columbia she had been sexually assaulted in high school, and she was very involved in this and was very clearly deeply

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involved in these issues. She asked for accommodations. She clearly was concerned and upset. The advisor gave her those accommodations.

THE COURT: That's what I'm trying to understand. She asked for an accommodation. What kind of an accommodation did she ask for and what reason did she give for that accommodation?

MS. KAPLAN: They were medical accommodations and they were relating to her academic tests, getting -- the document is in here. I'm trying to limit this.

THE COURT: I don't understand in what way that was a conversation about being raped.

MS. KAPLAN: It wasn't.

THE COURT: In what way was that a conversation about being sexually assaulted in any way?

MS. KAPLAN: It wasn't other than she pleads that she strongly alluded to. You have the documentation and she doesn't say that.

THE COURT: You just confused me when you said, when people ask for accommodations they assume it had something to do with a sexual assault.

MS. KAPLAN: What I'm saying is, that's one of the reasons people can ask for accommodations, but she does not say I was sexually assaulted; therefore, I want these accommodations.

THE COURT: Was it understood between the two people in the conversation that she was asking for an accommodation because she had been assaulted?

MS. KAPLAN: I think it was understood that she was asking for accommodations because she was in a bad way, but there were no details about why she was in a bad way is the way I would put it.

THE COURT: Why would somebody assume she is in a bad way because she had been recently sexually assaulted?

MS. KAPLAN: I agree. I don't think that's a fair inference. That's precisely our argument, your Honor. I don't think under *Iqbal* and *Twombly* that's plausible. I completely agree.

THE COURT: I don't understand what the dispute is between the two of you. What exhibit are you alluding to?

MS. KAPLAN: The communications with her advisor?

THE COURT: Yes.

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MS. KAPLAN: That's Exhibit 7.

THE COURT: Without indicating on the record, can you at least point me to the paragraph that you say is relevant.

MS. KAPLAN: Here is the perfect example. If you look at page 3 of 5, in the middle.

THE COURT: These are e-mail exchanges.

MS. KAPLAN: Yes. Take a look in the middle. There is an e-mail dated October 14, 2015 at 4:46, and there is a

statement to her from the advisor. I think that's the best explanation.

THE COURT: Let me look at that.

MS. KAPLAN: Then some of the academic accommodations

I was referring to, your Honor, are on page 1 of that document.

THE COURT: Is there somewhere in this document where it indicates what occurred to her?

MS. KAPLAN: No.

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THE COURT: Show me, what does CPS stand for?

MS. KAPLAN: Counseling and psychological services.

THE COURT: Now, are these documents reflecting some person-to-person, face-to-face conversation that occurred between her and the advisor?

MS. KAPLAN: She says she reached out to her academic advisor. It's not clear -- we don't know. She doesn't say she called her or met with her, but we do have these e-mails from that date.

THE COURT: You are not saying that this is the entire communication between her and the advisor and you don't know whether or not she walked into the advisor's office and had a unrecorded conversation with the advisor.

MS. KAPLAN: There is a reference here to reaching out on that date and there is a reference in the complaint that we do have communications on that date between her and her advisor, which is what we provided.

1 THE COURT: I understand.

MS. KAPLAN: Let's just go back to that. First of all, if we just kind of eliminate the exhibits, your Honor, and just look at the language in the complaint, the best that she can come up with is strongly alluded. We just don't think it's plausible that strongly alluded is enough in this context. If you go to the document, you can see from the context that the advisor has no basis or no information from which to assume or have knowledge of the alleged assaults.

Then, on top of that, remember, your Honor, the standard here is, is it clearly unreasonable under the circumstances. Even despite all that, as you see in the document, the advisor goes out of her way to provide plaintiff with every possible accommodation she is asking for. This is not a deliberately indifferent university. So given that fact, there is no way that she can meet the standard either.

I want to turn, if I could, your Honor, to the second time. Again, there are only two occasions that she says would have triggered a duty to investigate prior to the time the investigation actually occurred. The second one is on December 3, and we have talked about it a bit, and that's with the executive vice-president of University Life. This is a meeting that's explicitly dealt with in Columbia's policies and in the OCR guidelines.

What the DOE guidelines say is that in order for

students to feel free to participate in preventative

educational programs and access resources for survivors, or

other forums at which students disclose experiences with sexual

violence are not considered notice to the school for the

purposes of triggering an individual investigation, unless the

survivor initiates a complaint. Columbia's policies, once

again, mirror this, and you can look at Exhibit 1 attached to

my affidavit, which are the policies at page 11.

The meeting with the executive vice-president of student life, as we have discussed a bit already, your Honor, is precisely that kind of forum. Both the DOE laws and regs and Columbia's policies explicitly say that that does not trigger an investigation unless the student asks for an investigation.

What the plaintiff argues in response in her papers is that that explicit guidance for that particular situation should be overridden by general guidance. Just as a matter of kind of legal reasoning, as we explained in our brief, your Honor, that doesn't make any sense.

Moreover, when you go to plausibility standards, here we actually have more because she herself admits, and we talked about this at the beginning, that when she is reached out to in January, after she fills out the survey, she tells the person in January, after this meeting, weeks after, that she doesn't want to officially report. So even if you didn't have the

specific guidance, but you do, about student advocacy forums, which clearly applies here, it would be implausible, I believe, your Honor, for the Court to conclude that she would have given a different answer had she been contacted after that meeting than she did several weeks later when she told them, don't ever contact me again.

If I could, your Honor, let me turn to the case law. A district court in Virginia last year, faced with the same conundrum you're faced with, your Honor, noted there are very few cases addressing this issue of a university's obligation, if any, to proceed with an investigation into sexual assault where the victim does not want to participate. And the cite there is the *Butters* case, which is cited in our reply brief at page 5, footnote 3.

Indeed, the courts have generally recognized that it's hard to imagine how a university could take action reasonably calculated to end the harassment here due to an investigation without revealing the nature of the harassment, the identity of the harassers, and even the plaintiff's own identity, which in this case would have obviously been the plaintiff.

That is the problem that Columbia faced here, your Honor, that I've been discussing. Up until the summer of '16, Columbia really had no way of knowing what had happened, when or where it had happened, or who may have done it without plaintiff agreeing to cooperate.

I am going to point your Honor to two cases that deal with this specifically. There are not many cases, but there are two. One is the *Butters* case that I already referred your Honor to, and there the plaintiff alleged that she was assaulted by three male students and that the assault was filmed on videotape. She told the investigators — actually, the facts were better in *Butters* than they are here. She told the investigators that she did want there to be an investigation, but she wanted confidentiality, and she wanted the investigation to happen without her involvement.

The school officials concluded that the video alone wasn't enough information and they didn't pursue the investigation without her cooperation. The Court agreed that that could not start a Title IX violation because, as the Court concluded, given the plaintiff's grave concerns with confidentiality, it was not clearly unreasonable for the university to want her to consent to the process before investigating or charging the assailants.

Indeed, as here, once she did file her complaint later, the Court said that their lack of indifference, the university's lack of indifference, is further highlighted by the university's swift response once she did file her complaint. The key language in that case, your Honor, appears on pages 755 and 756. It's 208 F.Supp.3d 755 and 756.

There is another case, your Honor, which we did not

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cite in our briefs and I apologize for that. It's called Roe v. St. Louis University. It's an Eighth Circuit case from 2014. The cite there would be 746 F.3d 874. There the Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court's finding that a university did not act with deliberate indifference where, after a school employee learned that the plaintiff had been assaulted, the employee met with the plaintiff, referred her to a counselor, informed her how to file complaints, but the plaintiff declined to file a formal report of the assault and told university employees that she did not want her parents told. Again, the Eighth Circuit in that case relied expressly on the plaintiff's desire and intention and expression of wanting there to be confidentiality and not wanting to cooperate.

That's it, unless your Honor has questions. That's really my argument on the first claim that she has, which is the claim that the university should have somehow overridden her wishes, at least based on those two communications I talked about, and commenced an investigation anyway.

Let me turn to her other Title IX claim, which is for failure to accommodate. Here her argument, as I understand it, is that the university failed to provide her with the accommodations she asked for. Here, your Honor, we are dealing with a somewhat different problem. Here there is just zero specific allegations in the complaint of accommodations that she asked for and was not provided. Indeed, as your Honor

noted very early in my argument, when she talks about accommodations in the complaint, she actually concedes that they were provided to her.

Without that kind of specificity, the complaint has to fail. And indeed, as the cases we have cited say, a university is not obligated under Title IX to give a plaintiff or a student exactly what she asks for. It's only required to give reasonable accommodation. And here there is nothing in the complaint that alleges any reasonable accommodation that she asks for that was not provided.

And the Exhibit 7 that we looked at, your Honor, with respect to academic accommodations really shows how Columbia was going as far as it could and really working as hard as it could to provide her with every single type of accommodation that she was looking for. Given that, I just don't see any claims stated in this complaint for failure to accommodate.

There is one more Title IX claim that she states, and we apologize. I apologize for this, your Honor, because we were a little confused. When we first saw her complaint she has a complaint or a Title IX claim based on, quote, a sexually hostile culture. We thought it was the same thing she was alleging for the issues that we just talked about. Upon getting her papers we realized that she was alleging something different, that she was alleging preassault conduct by Columbia that was so egregious, in her view. This is what the cases

say, that Columbia violated Title IX before anything ever happened to her.

Your Honor, generally, this kind of preassault Title IX violation is looked down upon by the courts, it's frowned upon, and it's exceedingly rare. It's happened in a couple of cases. We cite them in our brief. But in those cases the plaintiff has to allege a general policy of indifference to sexual misconduct on campus. That comes from the Gebser case, which we cite, and the C.T. v. Liberal School District case, which we also cite in our briefs.

The factual situations in the cases that I found this are quite extreme, completely unlike anything that she alleges here or possibly could be alleged about Columbia. In Simpson, which is considered kind of the paradigmatic example of this, there is an official school program that was for football recruiting in which female students known as ambassadors were paired with male football recruits and asked to show them a good time. In that kind of pretty egregious scenario, the courts have found that you could have this preassault Title IX claim.

Baylor University, which I'm sure your Honor read about, Starr, Special Counsel Starr was actually the president and had to resign as a result of what happened there. There were allegations of just widespread ignorance and indifference in repeated occasions of trying to wipe complaints of sexual

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misconduct under the rug. Again, there is not a single allegation that there is anything like that in this complaint about Columbia, nor could there be.

Even in *Tubbs*, which plaintiff cites which comes from closer to this area, the allegation was that there had been a finding by the DOE against SUNY in that case of repeated violations — there are no allegations of any finding against Columbia by OCR and there has not been — that SUNY agreed to remedy the violations that DOE found and that SUNY subsequently failed to do so. Again, you are looking at extreme, for lack of a better term, *mens rea* on the part of the university that the plaintiff does not allege and could not allege with respect to Columbia. I think that deals with respect to the preassault sexually hostile claim.

All I have left, your Honor, and I'm happy to address it, if your Honor wishes -- I am not sure whether we have a dispute on this. I can leave it to plaintiffs -- all I have left are the state law claims. Our view, your Honor, as you might expect, if you dismiss the federal claims, then you have discretion and you should dismiss the state law claims here. As well, if plaintiff disagrees with that, I'm happy to address them on the merits.

THE COURT: Let me hear from the plaintiffs.

Mr. Zalkin.

MR. ZALKIN: Good morning, your Honor or I guess it's

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1 afternoon.

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THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MR. ZALKIN: Your Honor, I'd like to start with the extrinsic evidence offered in this case by defendant and offered with defendant's motion. It's our position that the exhibits sought to be introduced by defendant are wholly inappropriate, that they do not meet the requirements for the incorporation by reference doctrine and, therefore, it would be inappropriate for this Court to consider any of their contents when ruling on this motion.

Your Honor, this exact approach that defendant has taken here, namely, submitting extrinsic evidence on a motion to dismiss, and citing the incorporation by reference doctrine, was attempted and summarily rejected by the Court in Tubbs v.

Stony Brook University. In that case the defendant university introduced or sought to introduce and rely on 21 exhibits, similar in nature to the exhibits defendant has offered here.

And what the Court said in that case is, consideration of such evidence is wholly improper on a motion to dismiss where the inquiry is limited to whether plaintiff's allegations, accepted as true, state a claim as a matter of law.

THE COURT: Let's start with that because I'm not quite sure you objected shotgun approach to every one of their documents. I am not sure I know which ones you are really fighting about. The facts, as you're alleging them, are not

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inconsistent with the doctrines, nor are you alleging that those documents are somehow doctored or don't reflect the facts as you understand them to be.

It seems to me the crux of your argument is whether or not -- I'm trying to get a handle on the nature of your allegation, what it is that you say that she informed them of and what it is that she asked them to do that they failed to do and why did they have the responsibility to do an investigation when she said that she did not want an investigation. Those are the central issues here, as you've alleged.

MR. ZALKIN: If I understand your Honor's questions, they are kind of two separate questions there. One is, why were these documents inappropriate.

fighting over. I don't know which document you're fighting over. I don't know what that document says that you somehow are saying that, oh, that creates some disputed issue of fact that you think is inappropriate at this stage. The documents pretty much reflect what you say, unless you say that there is something that the documents are adding to your complaint or detracting from your complaint that you think is unfair. I don't need to concentrate on the documents. I need to concentrate on what you say the facts were and what you say she informed them of and what it is that she asked them to do that they failed to do.

MR. ZALKIN: We do maintain that the documents,

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several of the documents, seek to either disprove her allegations or expand on her allegations, both of which are inappropriate at the motion to dismiss stage.

THE COURT: Fine. Then I'll accept that premise. I still want to know the answers to my questions with regard to your complaint. I can tell you right away that it is an insufficient allegation, factual allegation to simply say, without explicitly saying that she was raped, plaintiff strongly alluded to her academic advisor that plaintiff had been raped. That's not a factual statement. I don't even know what that means. That's like saying, I went into McDonald's and without saying I wanted french fries, I strongly alluded to the fact that I wanted french fries. That's not a fact.

You've got to give me something that you say happened. If you don't want me to rely on their extrinsic evidence, then you have to put in some facts that tell me that I should conclude that the nature of this conversation was a conversation about rape and a conversation in which the only reasonable response would have been that they would have initiated an investigation that this person was raped, even though this person never said that they were raped. What does that mean?

MR. ZALKIN: I think at the pleading stage, your Honor, you are required to accept all reasonable inferences.

THE COURT: Of facts.

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MR. ZALKIN: Right. The inference to be drawn from that allegation --

THE COURT: How can you say someone didn't explicitly say they were raped but they strongly alluded to the fact that they been raped and that's supposed to be a fact that I am supposed to rely on? How is that a fact? That's not a fact. That's a conclusion. What are the facts that make that a reasonable conclusion? What is it that you are claiming that she said to the advisor that one would reasonably interpret as a conversation about rape?

MR. ZALKIN: Your Honor, that's probably best left for discovery.

THE COURT: No, it's not. You've got to give me a fact. That's not a fact. You say that you are relying on the fact that they had a conversation that would have put them on notice that it was about rape, even though no one said it was about rape. How am I supposed to say that that's a sufficient factual allegation? That's not a factual allegation. What is it that you say occurred in that conversation that would make the person that you could allege factually that would reasonably make that person on notice that this conversation was about rape?

MR. ZALKIN: We allege that she alluded to being raped.

THE COURT: What does that mean, she alluded to? How

1 does one allude to being raped?

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 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$  ZALKIN: There is no other allegation in the complaint.

THE COURT: I know. That's not a factual allegation.

I can't say you alluded to being run over by a truck. That's not a factual allegation. You have to tell me what was said.

What was said that you say is alluding to a rape? What factually are you trying to say?

MR. ZALKIN: I don't have the exact words that happened in that conversation.

THE COURT: Then I can't conclude that she alluded to being raped because you say she didn't say she was raped. In what way did she allude to it?

MR. ZALKIN: She had a conversation with her academic advisor in which she alluded to it. I don't know the words, the specific words that she used.

THE COURT: What makes you say she alluded to it?

MR. ZALKIN: I do know that her academic advisor was concerned enough to take it up the chain and say, something happened, something serious happened to this girl --

THE COURT: What would make that something serious that happened, being raped rather than some sort of emotional or mental breakdown?

MR. ZALKIN: Right. I don't have the exact words that were said.

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THE COURT: Give me in substance what words were said that would make me conclude that they had a conversation about rape. It is wholly inconsistent to say, without explicitly saying she was raped, she strongly alluded that she had been raped. It means nothing. I don't know what that means. How does one strongly allude to being raped if one doesn't say that they were raped?

MR. ZALKIN: I think in conversation we can allude to events without specifically --

THE COURT: What events are you saying she alluded to?

MR. ZALKIN: To being raped in her dorm room.

THE COURT: How does she allude to that event?

MR. ZALKIN: I get your --

THE COURT: What the nature of that conversation is and the way you've alleged it in the complaint and the way you are trying to explain it to me now makes me think that she never said anything about rape. You have given me no fact that you and I would conclude that she alluded to a rape. What makes you think that she alluded to a rape?

MR. ZALKIN: Because my client has explained to me that in this conversation she alluded to being raped, that her academic advisor understood that she was sexually assaulted, that she reported it up the chain, that the wellness advisor --

THE COURT: But she didn't report it up the chain.

MR. ZALKIN: The academic advisor reported it to her

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THE COURT: Did the academic advisor report to her immediate supervisor that the plaintiff had been raped?

MR. ZALKIN: I don't know the nature of what her academic --

THE COURT: But that's what you are claiming.

MR. ZALKIN: That's why we need to have discovery.

THE COURT: No. That's why you need to give me the facts because you know what your client said to the academic advisor and you know whether or not your client -- you know your client didn't say she was raped, right?

MR. ZALKIN: Right.

THE COURT: You want me to infer that somehow there was a conversation, that if you and I were in that conversation the only reasonable conclusion would be that we were in a conversation about rape. I don't know how to conclude that without a fact. You have to tell me what she said that would make — I have no idea how one cannot say that they were raped but could allude to the fact that they were raped. I have no idea what that means.

MR. ZALKIN: I understand, your Honor, and I don't have an answer to that question presently today. I can confer with my client and amend the complaint, if that is the crux of your Honor's decision. I would ask for leave to amend to allow me to provide that context to your Honor.

MR. ZALKIN: My client did not say that at that point.

THE COURT: Well, it doesn't matter at what point.

Let's start at the point that she did say that, if she said that on January 19.

MR. ZALKIN: Correct.

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THE COURT: Is there any reason that they would have

had a responsibility between January 19 and August 5 to open an investigation if she specifically told them not to open an investigation and she specifically said, don't contact me ever again about this?

MR. ZALKIN: Yes. First, your Honor, the conversation I was referencing occurred prior to.

THE COURT: I understand that. I just want to start with that because I want to see how far your argument goes. If she says on January 19, and then we can go back to December, if she says on January 19 that, I don't want to officially report this, I don't want you to investigate this, and in fact don't ever contact me again about this, what is your argument that from January 19 to August 5 that they had an obligation to do exactly what she told them not to do?

MR. ZALKIN: My argument is twofold, your Honor. First, the reason that she said those things to Ms. Blount at that time was because of her frustration with the process that she had received prior to that point in time.

THE COURT: Why would that matter?

MR. ZALKIN: Because at that point she had called the sexual violence hotline and she had said, I was raped, what are my options, what are my resources under Title IX, and the sexual hotline person did not know. They kept trying to convince her to report it to the police.

Then she asked the staff advocate, what are my options

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under Title IX? The Title IX staff advocate did not have an answer for her. She asked for housing accommodations.

THE COURT: What housing accommodations? You mean to put the lock --

MR. ZALKIN: She asked to move. She didn't feel safe in her dorm. She was told: OK. You have 24 hours from some arbitrary date that we are going to give you to move. You don't get any help with moving your physical belongings. You are going to have to pay \$500 and we are going to have to tell your parents why you are moving.

THE COURT: The awkward part of this is that despite all of that, on August 5, she said she did want the university to investigate. How does that change the analysis? That was a decision that she made. She had the same information that you're playing out for me now.

MR. ZALKIN: Yes.

THE COURT: At one point in time that information made her conclude that she did not want it investigated and she did not want to be contacted again. At a later point that same information made her conclude that she did want to go forward with an investigation. It's sort of irrelevant why she made whichever decision she made.

The question is, if she said to them, for whatever reason, she distrusts them, they didn't treat her well, somehow they didn't respond appropriately, that doesn't go to whether

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or not once she said, I don't like you, I don't want to put this in your hands, I don't think you are doing what you should be doing, so leave me alone and forget about it, why does that put a burden on them to do just the opposite simply because of her motivation of why she doesn't want them to do that, particularly in light of the fact that months later she changes her mind and does want them to do that? What difference does it make what her motivation is? If she says, I don't want you to do it, if she says that because I want my confidentiality protected or she says that because I don't think you people will do an adequate job and I don't want you to bother me at all about this because you just don't know what you are doing, regardless of what her reasons were, why would that put the obligation on them to do something when she told them not to do something?

MR. ZALKIN: Your Honor, the Supreme Court actually imposes that obligation on educational institutions.

THE COURT: To do what? To investigate --

MR. ZALKIN: To respond in a manner that's not clearly unreasonable to actual knowledge of sexual misconduct.

THE COURT: What is it that you think that they should have done if she said that she didn't want to make an investigation, she didn't want to initiate an investigation, and she was not going to cooperate with that investigation?

And, in fact, she made it real clear that she didn't even want

them to ever contact her again about this incident.

I understand all your other arguments about what could or couldn't have been done before January 19. I'm just trying to figure out how far you are trying to stretch that argument and whether you are trying to tell me to find some legal obligation on the part of Columbia to open an investigation after she said, I don't want you to open an investigation, I don't want you to do anything about this, I don't even want you to ever contact me again about this. What is the legal obligation that they have after she makes those statements to do anything to investigate until she comes back to them in August and says, you know what, I changed my mind, I want you to investigate? Why is anything that they did between January 19 and August 5 inappropriate, given her position with regard to what she wanted them to do?

MR. ZALKIN: Your Honor, the obligation is to respond in a way that is not clearly unreasonable. That may not necessarily mean that they need to formally investigate, but they are under an obligation to respond.

THE COURT: What are they under an obligation to do if she said she wasn't going to cooperate with any investigation and she wasn't going to give them any further information, and they didn't even have a suspect at that point in time, and she was not willing to cooperate to provide them any further information and didn't want them to contact anybody

specifically to ask them about this incident?

You say, they can't do something that's clearly unreasonable. What do you say would have been the reasonable response to her saying, don't open an investigation, leave me alone, don't contact me again, don't contact anybody else who might be witnesses because I don't want to get them involved. I want you to do nothing. Wouldn't you agree that what she said to them January 19 is that I want you to do nothing?

MR. ZALKIN: Yes.

THE COURT: Once she says to them, I want you to do nothing, and I will not cooperate, and I don't even want you to come to me and discuss this with me again, why would they say, yes, we will respect that, an unreasonable response?

MR. ZALKIN: Because I think they have an obligation to not only plaintiff at that point, but to the greater student community.

THE COURT: The greater student body isn't suing. She is suing personally for personal injury to herself. This isn't a class action. This is her saying that she was injured by the fact that they didn't do the investigations that she told them not to do. That part, you can understand, is an awkward part of your case between January and August because what I see, and we can go back and maybe you had a stronger argument prior to January.

But the scenario as you have relayed it is, in January

she said they took the initiative to try to discuss this with her, to try to initiate an investigation. She said, don't do it. She said, I don't want to talk to you about it anymore. I don't want you to talk to others about it. For whatever reason, good or bad or indifferent, I don't want you to do that. They say, fine, we will respect that, and we won't do anything because the reality is, the nature of your circumstance, the allegations are such there is not much we can do unless we can get some more information from you about the way, where, who, how, what happened. You don't want to give us that information. You don't want us to talk to other people who might have that information, and you don't want to be contacted about this again. We will respect that.

know what, I changed my mind. I want you to investigate. At that point clearly the proper response would have been, OK, we will open an investigation. That's what happened. She said, I changed my mind 10 months later or whatever months later. I want you to investigate. They said they would. She says that just before school starts, as I understand. As soon as school starts, within a month, they open an investigation. They investigate. They take her statement. They try to find videotapes which aren't existing anymore about intruders from a year earlier, and they do an investigation.

I don't understand why their response to the July 19

request not to investigate and their response to the August 5 request to investigate, I am not sure I understand, by the nature of your allegation, why their response to those two incidents was inappropriate. We can go back to before that and after that, but tell me what was inappropriate about what they did in January and how they responded to her request not to investigate and what they did in August, how they responded to her request to investigate in August. What was inappropriate about their response?

MR. ZALKIN: So the reason why I'm arguing that they had an obligation to do something in January is because you can't divorce that conversation from its context, everything that happened prior to. To accept that premise would be to incentivize educational institutions to drag their feet, to not accommodate students, to discourage students from reporting. And then when a student finally throws their hands up and says, you know what, forget about it, it absolves them of any responsibility from doing anything. That's not consistent with the Title IX.

THE COURT: But the problem I have with your allegation is that in this timeline I don't see any place where she made a formal request or report of the incident, one that would clearly be a report indicating that she wanted them to investigate. Would you agree that between October 5 and December 3 that she did not make a report on which she expected

1 | them to do an investigation?

MR. ZALKIN: She did not make a formal report.

THE COURT: I didn't say it that way. I said it even broader than that. Don't you agree that she did not make a report that she expected the university to initiate an investigation as a result of that report any time between October 5 and December 3?

MR. ZALKIN: I don't think her subjective expectations are what the law  $-\!$ 

THE COURT: I didn't ask you that. I just asked you a fact. Is that a fact?

MR. ZALKIN: That is a fact. She did not say to anybody --

THE COURT: You want to characterize the meeting with the executive vice-president as her request -- that her reporting a rape and asking them to investigate.

MR. ZALKIN: I'm characterizing that as the university's actual knowledge that she was raped. And what the Supreme Court in *Davis* tells us is that a university or an educational institution, upon receiving actual knowledge, not necessarily a formal report, not any subjective report or desire to investigate or anything like that, the Supreme Court says, upon receiving actual knowledge of sexual misconduct an educational institution has a duty to respond in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable in light of the known

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THE COURT: If she tells them on December 3 that she was assaulted on October 5 and then she is again assaulted on December 14, you are not arguing that they were put on notice of the December 14 assault. That's not your argument.

MR. ZALKIN: No, that's not our argument.

THE COURT: Your argument is they had an obligation to respond only to the October 5 because obviously as of December 3 there was no way to report a December 14 assault.

MR. ZALKIN: Sure.

THE COURT: After December 14 she does not report that assault, the second assault, and then by January 19 they reach out to her.

MR. ZALKIN: Yes.

THE COURT: It's clear, by January 19 they are on notice of a sexual assault.

MR. ZALKIN: Yes.

THE COURT: January 19 they reach out to her. At that point she has been assaulted twice.

MR. ZALKIN: Yes.

THE COURT: In October and in December. On January

19, approximately 35 days after the second assault, she says to
them that she does not want to officially report her assault,
that she doesn't want an investigation open, and that they are
not to contact her ever again. What is their obligation at

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2 MR. ZALKIN: Their obligation would have started --

THE COURT: At that point.

MR. ZALKIN: At that point, presumably, they would have responded in some way to her initial report.

THE COURT: Not presumably. We know they didn't respond.

MR. ZALKIN: Should have responded.

THE COURT: Fine. They should have responded. But as of January 19, approximately a month after the second assault that she did not formally report, she told them that she did not want an investigation done of either assault and they should never contact her again.

MR. ZALKIN: Yes.

THE COURT: I am trying to figure out from your complaint what it is you say is their obligation at that time.

MR. ZALKIN: They have an obligation to take reasonable steps to mitigate the sexually hostile environment for plaintiff on campus.

THE COURT: What does that mean?

MR. ZALKIN: For one, they could have moved her.

THE COURT: But she didn't ask to be moved.

MR. ZALKIN: She had already asked to be moved prior

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THE COURT: That's not my understanding. When did she

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MR. ZALKIN: She asked to be moved --

THE COURT: My recollection is, she asked to be moved after they did the investigation in September and October of 2016.

MR. ZALKIN: She asked again to be moved at that point. She asked to be moved originally.

THE COURT: When?

MR. ZALKIN: In her conversation with the sexual violence response staff advocate.

THE COURT: How is that supposed to have gotten to the university? That's a confidential conversation. That's not a conversation with the university.

MR. ZALKIN: She was also told by the housing --

THE COURT: When did she tell the university?

That I want to be moved because I was raped? Is that what you are saying? Because I don't see that. She doesn't say that, does she?

MR. ZALKIN: My understanding, your Honor, is she spoke to the staff advocate, reported that she was raped.

THE COURT: You say the conversation with the staff advocate triggers their responsibility.

MR. ZALKIN: What I'm saying is, she was told by the staff advocate that if she wanted to be moved, these were the owner's conditions that were going to be placed on her.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this. Is the staff advocate an employee of the university?

MR. ZALKIN: I believe so.

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THE COURT: Are you arguing that the conversations with the sexual violence response hotline is a conversation that should be imputed to the university?

MR. ZALKIN: No. I'm arguing that this Court can consider those conversations in assessing the reasonableness of defendant's conduct.

THE COURT: Your first argument, when we started this part of the conversation, was that she asked for a reasonable accommodation which they denied and then I asked you, where did she ask for a reasonable accommodation of the university? And you say, well, she said something to the staff advocate about it. Well, that's not a request to the university, is it?

MR. ZALKIN: I think it was a request for information

about --

THE COURT: Right. If that person gave her wrong information, that's not imputed to the university.

MR. ZALKIN: I think if that person gave her the wrong information, it would actually be evidence of the reasonableness of defendant's conduct.

THE COURT: But I'm still not following that argument. If she wants a reasonable accommodation, is the appropriate person to ask for an accommodation the staff advocate at the

sexual violence response hotline?

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MR. ZALKIN: I don't know if there is necessarily an appropriate person.

THE COURT: It's not the appropriate person. That person doesn't have that responsibility and that communication with that person is not to be shared with the university.

Isn't that the premise of how the hotline is set up?

MR. ZALKIN: That's true. My understanding is the advocate is somebody that you can speak to in order to understand your rights and resources under Title IX, one of which is, as the gender-based misconduct policy states, that a student will get reasonable accommodations. If you are asking the staff advocate, what are my rights and resources under Title IX, I think that staff advocate would not know the policies —

THE COURT: But you are not saying that she asked the staff advocate, Paul, to give her another room and Paul refused to do so. That's not what you are arguing, right?

MR. ZALKIN: No.

THE COURT: And you are not arguing that she ever asked the university to give her another residence and the university refused to do so, are you?

MR. ZALKIN: The university never refused to give her another room.

THE COURT: You said, well, they didn't accommodate

her. And I said, well, what didn't they accommodate? You said, giving her another room. I said, when she asked for either a lock on the door or another off-campus location, they offered her the choice and she took one or the other, so they did accommodate her. But you said they didn't accommodate her back in October of 2015 when she wanted an accommodation. Then I asked you, when in October did she ask the university for an accommodation and you say to me, well, she just asked some questions of the staff advocate but never really asked the university if she could have another room. As a matter of fact, at that point she never even told the university that she had an incident, right?

MR. ZALKIN: Correct.

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THE COURT: How would they be informed of a reasonable accommodation with regard to a rape if she never informed the university at that point in time that she had been raped.

MR. ZALKIN: That's fair, your Honor, and admittedly I don't know the exact person and circumstances. I know she discussed it with the staff advocate. I don't know exactly if she formally requested that accommodation.

THE COURT: So the crux of your complaint is that as of December 3, when she was in the meeting with the university's executive vice-president, and she said in that open forum that she had been raped, that triggered their responsibility to do an investigation, take some affirmative

action, and reasonably accommodate her?

MR. ZALKIN: Yes.

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THE COURT: Don't they have to reasonably accommodate some request?

MR. ZALKIN: Well --

THE COURT: She didn't make a request.

MR. ZALKIN: That's correct, your Honor. If she had made a formal request for accommodations --

THE COURT: But she did not.

MR. ZALKIN: Right. But it does trigger their obligation to respond in a way that's clearly not unreasonable.

THE COURT: Isn't part of the university's response that the case manager, Ms. Blount, called on the 19th and said, I understand that you were raped, we want to investigate this, and she said, no, don't do it? Wouldn't that be a reasonable response? To call and say to her that we understand that you have indicated to us, we are acknowledging that as of January we think that you have been raped, it's our obligation to do something, let us do something, and she says no, don't do anything?

MR. ZALKIN: Yeah. I think a reasonable juror could look at that and say, it was reasonable to not investigate.

They could informally question people on her floor.

THE COURT: Didn't she say she didn't want them to talk to anybody?

MR. ZALKIN: The allegations are still that she was violently raped twice in her dorm room. I think they had an obligation at least to try to figure out what, if anything, happened.

THE COURT: Not on the scenario you just stated because they had no information at that point that she had been raped.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$  ZALKIN: They had information that she was at least raped once.

THE COURT: You said there was information that she had been raped twice. She may have discussed the December 3 incident in a public forum, but she never discussed the December 14 incident with the university.

MR. ZALKIN: Correct. I misspoke if I said twice. I meant to say they had at least knowledge, actual knowledge of one of her assaults, and they could have at least done something --

THE COURT: They did do something. They did something on January 19. They said, we understand that you were raped and we want to do an investigation.

MR. ZALKIN: Correct.

THE COURT: That's what they did do. That would be the appropriate thing to do, correct?

MR. ZALKIN: That could be an appropriate thing to do.

THE COURT: That was an appropriate thing to do.

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MR. ZALKIN: Because there is also the larger question of, there is an alleged rapist on the loose at Columbia University, in your dorm room perhaps, and they did nothing to determine what, if anything --

THE COURT: I am not sure that she has standing to sue for that because that didn't cause her any injury.

MR. ZALKIN: It did, your Honor.

THE COURT: What injury did it cause her once she told them she did want not want them to investigate, so they stopped investigating. And once she told them she did want them to investigate, then they did investigate. What is the injury that was caused by them -- you say, well, they had an obligation to others. I'm concentrating on the obligation they had to her because she is the one suing. She is not suing on behalf of others. She is here suing on behalf of her behalf saying that she suffered injury because, one, they didn't properly investigate the rapes and, two, because they didn't accommodate her. I am not sure in what way you are arguing that they didn't accommodate her and a reasonable accommodation that she requested from them, and I am not sure what you are saying that they should have done other than what they did in January. If they did on December 4 what they did on January 19, wouldn't that have been an appropriate response?

part of the appropriate response.

MR. ZALKIN: That would potentially would have been

THE COURT: That would have been the appropriate response because she said in light of that response she didn't want them to do anything else. Is it your argument that even though she said she didn't want them to do anything else for her that they should have done something else for her?

MR. ZALKIN: Yes, your Honor.

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THE COURT: What else should they have done for her when she said she didn't want them to do anything else for her?

MR. ZALKIN: I think what she said is, I don't want to

talk to you about this.

THE COURT: You don't need a rocket scientist to figure out what that means. It means leave me alone. I don't want you to do an investigation and I don't want to talk about this anymore. What should have they done? They should have forced her to cooperate?

MR. ZALKIN: They could have perhaps, like I said, interviewed other people on the floor, her suite mates, to see if anybody saw anything. They could have reviewed the security tapes at the time.

THE COURT: Suppose at that point they spoke to people, they found out who it was and they took action against that person. I can't say it that way because I am not sure what they could have done with that information if she said she didn't want that information ever disclosed.

MR. ZALKIN: That presupposes that if they had

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actually found the individual that did this that she would have been consistent in saying --

THE COURT: You have to presuppose that because she cut that off. She prevented that from happening.

MR. ZALKIN: She prevented that under the belief that Columbia had not done anything in response --

THE COURT: In response to what?

MR. ZALKIN: Initially, when she called the sexual violence hotline, that she was giving no information.

THE COURT: What does that have to do with whether Columbia is going to do an investigation, calling the hotline?

MR. ZALKIN: Your question was, if they had caught this individual and they wanted to do something about it.

THE COURT: And she said, don't talk to me ever again.

MR. ZALKIN: I'm saying, I don't think it's a fair assumption to make that she would say, don't do it again, I don't want anything to do with this if in fact they had investigated and caught the individual.

THE COURT: On October 3, when she spoke to the sexual violence response hotline and reported that she had been assaulted, tell me what they should have done.

MR. ZALKIN: When she had asked what her rights and resources under Title IX were --

THE COURT: I'm talking about the first conversation on October 3. What is it that they did that was improper?

MR. ZALKIN: They were unaware of Title IX, the rights and resources available to sexual assault victims. They weren't able to give her that information.

THE COURT: Give her what information? I don't know what you're talking about because you have not alleged

what you're talking about because you have not alleged anything. Is there some factual allegation in this complaint regarding that? I am not sure what you're talking about. She asked them what?

MR. ZALKIN: She asked for, what are her rights and options and resources available to her as a sexual assault victim.

THE COURT: When she was on the phone, on the hotline.

MR. ZALKIN: Yes.

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THE COURT: And the hotline person told her --

MR. ZALKIN: Was unable to answer that question.

THE COURT: So the hotline person said, I will have somebody call you the next day?

MR. ZALKIN: Right.

THE COURT: You don't think that that was an appropriate response if the person really doesn't know who is on the hotline that they would say, well, I will have somebody call you back tomorrow?

MR. ZALKIN: What we allege in our complaint, your Honor, is that that sexual violence hotline operator was untrained. What we are saying is that what's reasonable is if

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you are going to have a sexual violence hotline where you know victims of sexual violence are going to call and report these things and undoubtedly are going to ask what are my options, it would be reasonable to train the individuals to take those calls to answer those questions.

THE COURT: I don't understand. The next day, the very next day, on October 14, they in fact had, I assume, a more knowledgeable person call her back.

MR. ZALKIN: That's an incorrect assumption.

THE COURT: I assume they had a less knowledgeable person call her back. I'll give it whatever inference you want, but the person called her back.

MR. ZALKIN: And she asked him, what are my rights and resources under Title IX, and he was unable to answer that question.

THE COURT: The problem is, you have the October 5 assault. You have an October 14 conversation. Even in that conversation she says that she doesn't want to report the assault.

MR. ZALKIN: To the police.

THE COURT: I don't know. You say that. She said she wanted to report it to the university but not the police.

MR. ZALKIN: I can represent to you now that if allowed to amend the complaint on that issue I can tell you that she did not want to report this to the police.

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1 THE COURT: Did she want to report it to the 2 university? 3 MR. ZALKIN: At that point she wasn't sure. But she 4 wanted to know --5 THE COURT: Did she say to the person, I don't want to report this alleged assault? 6 7 MR. ZALKIN: She said that in the context of the police. 8 9 THE COURT: Did she say she did want to report it to 10 the university or she said nothing about the university, or she 11 said she didn't want to report it to the university? MR. ZALKIN: She didn't say anything about reporting 12 13 it to the university. What she asked for were, what are my 14 rights, what are my options, what are my resources under Title 15 IX at this point. That would have included what her option --16 THE COURT: I assume that they told her in that 17 conversation that she could report it either to the police or 18 she could report it to the university, right? Are you saying 19 they didn't have that basic information? 20 MR. ZALKIN: As alleged, when asked, did she report it 21 to the school -- when asked, what are my options under Title 22 IX, the operator was unable to answer that question. 2.3 THE COURT: You are not arguing that she didn't know 24 that her options were to either report this to the police or

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report it to the university?

1 MR. ZALKIN: Right.

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THE COURT: You are not arguing that. That's not really a reasonable argument to make.

MR. ZALKIN: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: She spoke to the hotline on October 3, made some inquiries of the hotline. They said we would have somebody call you back October 4. They called her back.

Regardless of what questions they could or couldn't answer, she knew that there were at least two options. She could make a formal criminal complaint, an actual criminal investigation by the police, and/or she could report it to the university on the university's procedure that she was well aware of and the university would have had an obligation to investigate, right? She knew that.

MR. ZALKIN: She knew she had the option to report it to the school, yes.

THE COURT: She did not, right?

MR. ZALKIN: At that point, no.

THE COURT: And you say that her statement on December 3 at this meeting was her attempt to report this to the university for the university to investigate it?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$$  ZALKIN: No. I'm saying what that was was actual knowledge.

THE COURT: You are just saying that put them on knowledge, but that wasn't her request.

MR. ZALKIN: It wasn't a formal or otherwise a request to investigate. It put them on knowledge that the Supreme Court tells us that's the trigger that obligates a response.

THE COURT: Is there any indication prior to August 5 of 2016 that she wanted to report this to the university, wanted the university to investigate it, and she would cooperate with such an investigation? Is there any indication that she was of that mind at any time prior to August 5?

MR. ZALKIN: I think the fact that she continued to

MR. ZALKIN: I think the fact that she continued to call the university --

THE COURT: What do you mean by the fact that she continued to call --

MR. ZALKIN: There is confidential resources at first. She gets raped. She calls the sexual violence hotline. That's step No. 1.

THE COURT: As long as she knows that's not a report for an investigation.

MR. ZALKIN: Right. But you are asking me to assess whether or not she would have potentially participated in some investigation.

THE COURT: No. I'm trying to find out what posture the university was in when they were having communications with her and what communications they had with her and what is the basis for alleging that she sought them to do something to either protect her from further injury or to alleviate her

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situation, and she sought that kind of assistance from the university and they denied her that assistance. That's the first thing I'm trying to figure out. I can't see any place before August 5 that she ever requested or took any steps to initiate that kind of activity by the university. On August 5, when she did do that, the university did respond.

MR. ZALKIN: My response to that, your Honor, is the law doesn't put the burden on the victim to request or initiate that response. It puts the burden on the university once they obtain actual knowledge to put that response in motion. She is not obligated to go to the university and say, I want you to investigate.

THE COURT: What is the university's responsibility if a person says, this is what happened to me, I don't want it investigated, I don't want you to talk to me about it further. I don't want you to talk to witnesses about it. I don't want you to do anything about it. What is their obligation with regard to that particular individual?

MR. ZALKIN: The only answer I have to that is to respond in a way that's not clearly unreasonable.

THE COURT: What is unreasonable how they handled her? Because she is the plaintiff and you want relief.

MR. ZALKIN: What I'm alleging is that it's unreasonable to not train your first responders to sexual violence on policies and procedures.

82 H Case 1.17-cv-02032-GBD Document 41 Filed 08/16/17 Page 82 of 99 1 Where is that in this complaint? Is there THE COURT: 2 a paragraph --3 MR. ZALKIN: Paragraph 32 to 33 and 34. 4 Inadequate information from the hotline? THE COURT: 5 MR. ZALKIN: Correct. THE COURT: Which paragraph? 6 7 MR. ZALKIN: 32 through 34. 8 THE COURT: In 32, though, you do say that she was 9 advised that she could report her rape to the police. 10 MR. ZALKIN: That's not at issue. 11 THE COURT: What is the inadequate information that they didn't have that she was seeking from them that's 12 13 reflected in paragraph 32? 14 MR. ZALKIN: I think what would be reasonable to 15 respond to, when someone says, what are my rights and options under Title IX. 16 17 THE COURT: That's not what it says. You don't say in 18 this paragraph that she ever says, what are my rights and 19 options. 20 MR. ZALKIN: She asked what her resources were. 21 THE COURT: In paragraph 32?

MR. ZALKIN: 32 and 33.

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THE COURT: I don't see that in 32. It says she reported to them that she was raped, and they advised her that she could report her rape to the police. That's what 32 says.

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Doesn't say anything about any other adequate or inadequate information or requests for information. In 33 it said she requested of the nurse information about how to receive academic and housing accommodations and that they didn't know anything about academic and housing accommodations. That's what 34 says.

MR. ZALKIN: That's what I'm referring to.

THE COURT: Why would the hotline necessarily know what the options would be for academic and housing accommodations?

MR. ZALKIN: Because those are necessarily the accommodations that are made to victims of sexual assault under Title IX.

THE COURT: Wasn't she aware of what those options were? The option was exactly what she did. She went to her academic advisor and she sought those accommodations from her academic advisor.

MR. ZALKIN: Ultimately, yeah.

THE COURT: Ultimately meaning when?

MR. ZALKIN: I believe it was October 14.

THE COURT: The next day.

MR. ZALKIN: Yes.

THE COURT: Wait a minute. Think about what you just said. You said the totally inadequate thing they did they did on October 13 and 14. It was not explained to her what her

THE COURT: Why should she recover as a result of that if she was not damaged by that?

it's, did this school act clearly and unreasonably --

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MR. ZALKIN: I think that probably goes to our first cause of action, which is a general policy of indifference to sexual misconduct on campus.

THE COURT: What is the facts that you give me that show that there is a general indifference to assaults on campus? What paragraphs do you lay that out?

MR. ZALKIN: Paragraphs 8 and 15, your Honor, we allege, there have been close to 30 administrative complaints filed by Columbia students with the department of education each claiming Columbia failed --

THE COURT: Where are you reading from?

MR. ZALKIN: Paragraphs 8 and 15.

THE COURT: Which one did you just read?

MR. ZALKIN: Paragraph 8.

THE COURT: Paragraph 8 says: Among the key allegations in these administrative complaints were accusations against Columbia. You were relying on those accusations against Columbia.

MR. ZALKIN: Yes. If I can back up, your Honor, and talk about the case law interpreting this cause of action. In *Tubbs*, your Honor, the Court found that there could be preassault Title IX reliability where the university was aware of the significant amount of sexual assaults on campus.

THE COURT: You don't have those facts here. Those facts have not been established as to Columbia.

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MR. ZALKIN: We have alleged that at least 30 individuals filed claims with the department of education claiming that they were assaulted.

THE COURT: That's not what it says. Where does it say that?

MR. ZALKIN: In my notes I have it at paragraph 8 and paragraph 15.

THE COURT: Is that in this complaint? You say the people have complained about certain things to the department of education about Columbia.

MR. ZALKIN: Yes. We also added that Columbia is under several OCR investigations.

THE COURT: You said those investigations in and of itself.

MR. ZALKIN: They are being investigated for their failure to comply with department of education guidelines in response to sexual misconduct on campus. We say that Columbia has pressured victims not to report their sexual misconduct.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. Where do you say that?

MR. ZALKIN: Again, in my notes I have it at paragraphs 8 and 15.

THE COURT: Where in paragraph 8 or 15?

MR. ZALKIN: I don't have the complaint in front of me, your Honor. I'm sorry.

THE COURT: I don't see it in 8. You say 15.

MR. ZALKIN: Yes.

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THE COURT: 15 says: In the spring of 2015, Columbia threatened student activists and journalists with suspension or expulsion for handing out flyers to prospective students asking for better sexual violence prevention education at Columbia.

Two students subsequently had to attend disciplinary meetings where they were threatened with expulsion.

How does that make this Title IX sexual assault responses to individual cases inappropriate?

MR. ZALKIN: I think my notes should reflect paragraphs 8 through 15 because I think that's that whole section with the heading that says Columbia's kind of general misconduct or policy.

THE COURT: How do you characterize your independent claim, as a what?

MR. ZALKIN: It is a claim that Columbia had a general policy of indifference to sexual misconduct on campus.

THE COURT: How does she recover on that claim? What are you asking for?

MR. ZALKIN: I think that the *Doe 1 v. Baylor* case answers that question. And what the Court said in that case was that this general policy of indifference creates a heightened risk for sexual misconduct to occur. It effectively creates a sexually hostile culture on campus.

THE COURT: You're extrapolating that they are

responsible for her having been raped.

2 MR. ZALKIN: Yes.

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THE COURT: She is suing them for the rape injuries because they didn't meet their obligations to her with regard to preventing this rape?

MR. ZALKIN: With regard to complying with Title IX.

THE COURT: I don't know what you mean by complying with Title IX. Either they are responsible for her assault or they are not responsible for her assault under this theory. Is that what you are saying, they are responsible for her assault to the extent that they must pay her damages for her injuries?

MR. ZALKIN: They are responsible for creating a sexually hostile environment in which sexual violence was ignored.

THE COURT: Not in your case on those circumstances.

Nobody in those cases holds the institution responsible for the rape because --

MR. ZALKIN: In both  $\mathit{Tubbs}$  and  $\mathit{Doe}\ 1\ v.\ \mathit{Baylor}$ , the courts did actually that.

THE COURT: Held them responsible for the rapes and damages to the plaintiff?

MR. ZALKIN: They deny the defendant's motions to dismiss on the exact same theory that we are offering here.

THE COURT: So you say that they have created some environment that makes it more likely that students are going

to be raped?

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2 MR. ZALKIN: Yes.

THE COURT: And you say that in the ways that are alleged in paragraphs 8 through what?

MR. ZALKIN: Through 15.

If I could back up, your Honor, in the *Doe 1 v. Baylor* case, under the same theory, the Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss where the plaintiff alleged that the school misinformed victims about their rights under Title IX.

THE COURT: You don't have any allegation that Columbia misinformed people.

MR. ZALKIN: No. And I'm not arguing that Columbia's actions here exactly mirror the allegations in the other cases, but what I'm saying is, we have alleged allegations similar in nature such that this Court could also find that Columbia's deficiencies created a sexually hostile culture on the campus in violation —

THE COURT: That's a totally different claim. You claim that they caused the rape is a different claim than they didn't respond accurately under Title IX.

MR. ZALKIN: Two distinct theories of liability.

THE COURT: Not just two distinct theories of liability. They are not even based on the same set of facts.

MR. ZALKIN: They are not based on the same set of facts, no. One involves preassault conduct and a kind of

general policy argument. One involves specific actions postknowledge --

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THE COURT: You say at this point that your complaint is sufficient to allege sexually hostile culture at the university that makes them liable for her rape and, two, that they violated Title IX and their obligations to her under Title IX by not taking steps earlier than her request that they investigate by not taking steps to investigate this when they first became aware of her claim of having been assaulted in October of 2015.

MR. ZALKIN: That's correct, your Honor. And we are also arguing that their failure to adhere to the department of education guidelines also supports the theory of liability.

THE COURT: Which theory of liability?

MR. ZALKIN: The one that they acted with deliberate indifference to her specific report of sexual violence.

THE COURT: I'm trying to understand, when do you say they acted with deliberate indifference?

MR. ZALKIN: From the point where --

THE COURT: From what date to what date?

MR. ZALKIN: From the point where reported it initially to the sexual violence hotline to the point where they concluded their investigation.

THE COURT: You are taking that beyond January 19. In way were they indifferent to her circumstances after August 5

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of 2016? They did an investigation. You don't say it was anything inadequate --

MR. ZALKIN: They did an investigation, correct. Our argument is, they should have done that investigation when they first learned of her sexual assault. At that point there would have been more resources available to them. They would have had the security footage. More than likely, witnesses would have had a fresher recollection in their mind.

THE COURT: You think that they had a responsibility to do an investigation on January 20?

MR. ZALKIN: I think they had an ongoing responsibility to respond beginning --

THE COURT: That's not my question. My question is, on January 20, do you think that they had an obligation to investigate?

MR. ZALKIN: Yes. They had an obligation to do something. The reason I bring up the department of education is because the department of education, their guidelines actually say, even if the victim doesn't want to report or wants to remain confidential, the school must still take all reasonable steps --

THE COURT: What do you think would have been a reasonable step? What else --

MR. ZALKIN: As I mentioned before, they could have interviewed people in her dorm.

THE COURT: Even if she didn't want them interviewed? 1 2 MR. ZALKIN: Even if she didn't want them interviewed. 3 THE COURT: That's not respecting her confidentiality 4 if they are going to tell everybody in her dormitory that she 5 is a victim of a rape. MR. ZALKIN: They don't have to necessarily say --6 7 THE COURT: How can they ask them questions? 8 MR. ZALKIN: Did you see anything suspicious? Did you 9 hear anything suspicious? Has there been any stranger lurking 10 around this room? 11 THE COURT: She didn't provide them with any information that anybody would have been able to give any such 12 13 information, did she? 14 MR. ZALKIN: She reported that she was raped in her 15 dorm. What I'm saying is --16 THE COURT: They should have canvassed the dorm and 17 asked people what? 18 MR. ZALKIN: They could have taken some steps. They 19 could have looked at swipe logs at the time. They could have 20 seen if there was a student in the dorm that didn't live there. 21 They could have asked if there has been any suspicious people 22 in the dorm. They could have asked the resident advisor if the 2.3 resident advisor had seen anybody --24 THE COURT: And you think that I should say and you

think there is case law to support the conclusion that they

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should have done that even though she specifically asked them not to do that?

MR. ZALKIN: The department of education says that.

And what the case law says is that failure to adhere to the department of education's guidelines is some something that a reasonable juror could look to and say, they didn't act reasonably.

THE COURT: I guess part of it is my not understanding the theory. If they didn't do these things and they didn't do these things because she asked them not to do these things, how were they liable to her? There may be somebody else out there who might have a complaint about it, who wanted it investigated, and it could have prevented some other incident that might have happened. How are they liable to her as a plaintiff if they did what she asked them to do?

MR. ZALKIN: Because the damage in a Title IX case is the exposure to a sexually hostile environment. It is gender discrimination --

THE COURT: You don't claim that she was exposed to a sexually hostile environment after she reported it.

MR. ZALKIN: We do.

THE COURT: What type of hostile environment do you allege that she was exposed to that she is suing for?

MR. ZALKIN: Her rapist was on the loose.

THE COURT: But she didn't want him caught. She

didn't say, investigate, go get the rapist. She said, don't do it.

MR. ZALKIN: The reason she said don't do it -THE COURT: There may be a very good reason, but that

doesn't mean that if she has a good reason that she doesn't want them to investigate by them respecting that good reason

7 that they are somehow liable in damages because they did what

she asked them to do.

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MR. ZALKIN: The reason the context is important is because it ultimately got to the point where in her mind she was throwing up her hands saying, these guys don't care about anybody.

THE COURT: You know what the problem with that argument is, that argument doesn't apply to any lawsuit.

That's not a justification. That doesn't change the law.

Because I say, well, don't drive me across the bridge because I don't think you know how to drive. If you drive me off the bridge into the water, it doesn't change what the claim is.

The claim is irrelevant to what her motivations were as to why she asked them to take certain action and not take certain action.

It would be one thing if you were saying that she asked them to investigate this and they refused to investigate. But it's more difficult for you to argue that she can sue them if she asked them not to expose her this way in an

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investigation. They did what she asked them to do.

And then you say to me now, well, the only reason she asked them not to do it is because she thinks that they were doing a terrible job. They may have been doing a terrible job. But then you can't fault them for not doing a good job because you told them not to do any job.

MR. ZALKIN: I understand that logic, your Honor.

THE COURT: Case law says that you can sue on that basis or makes a difference whether you had a good reason or a bad reason to tell them, don't investigate. If you tell them don't investigate, they don't owe you an investigation, right?

MR. ZALKIN: Right. I'm unaware of any case law that addresses that specific issue. I know that the department of education explicitly says that the wishes of the victim, while important, are not completely dispositive of a university's decision to investigate or not.

I also know that the law does not place the onus on a victim to ask the university to respond to a report. It puts the onus on the university once they attain actual knowledge to respond.

THE COURT: I understand.

Did you have anything quickly you want to respond? I kept the court reporter over.

MR. ZALKIN: Thank you, your Honor.

MS. KAPLAN: Your Honor, subject to not torturing the

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your court reporter further, I am going to be brief.

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As your Honor has pointed out in your questioning, there is a strong river of irony underlying plaintiff's theory in this case. Plaintiff herself says in the documents we submitted over and over again that she was an expert on Columbia's policies. She concedes that she was a member of the activist groups relating to these issues on campus and was fully familiar with the resources available, the law, and the obligations.

In our brief I noted that had Columbia overridden her wishes and investigated anyway, she likely would have sued us for doing that. But to put it another way, your Honor, if you had posited to any student activist, like the plaintiff, at the beginning of this case, when she first entered Columbia, that Columbia in these circumstances should have overridden the clear and express desires of the victim, they would have told you you were insane. I talked about for the reasons cited in our brief, underlying their policy, which is reflected in the DOE is the utmost respect for the dignity and the confidentiality and the wishes of victims, subject to certain conditions that we talked about earlier.

Now, Exhibits 4 and 5, which I'll refer your Honor to -- again, I'm trying to be sensitive here -- are the contemporaneous communications of both the sexual violence call on October 13 and the follow-up afterwards. And I would refer

your Honor on Exhibit 15 to the footnote at the bottom that has two little stars on it. I'm not going to read it into the record, but it explains quite well, I believe, exactly what was going on. And in the transcript of the call, the sexual violence hotline there are repeated references throughout on page 3, on page 5 about her insistence about not reporting.

Moreover, I want to clarify one point that came up in your conversation with my friend here. There is no evidence in the record anywhere that plaintiff told anyone that the alleged assault had happened in her dorm room until she formally reported in the summer. Indeed, if you look at the paragraph in the complaint that talks about the student forum with the executive vice-president of University Life, she alleges at paragraph 44 that she shared that she had been raped, but she does not allege that she shared that she had been raped in her dorm room. And in all the exhibits we submitted anywhere else there is no allegation that plaintiff specified anything about her dorm room until she formally reported later in the summer.

With respect to the meeting with the executive vice-president of life, I'll refer your Honor again to Columbia's policies about student advocacy forums, as well as the DOE guidelines on that, both of which expressly limit and exclude those forums from official reporting obligations.

As your Honor pointed out with respect to the contact in January, in January, again, there is kind of a causation

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1 problem.

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In my spare time, as your Honor probably knows, I practice securities law, and in securities law there is this concept of very complicated concepts of but for and proximate causation. Here, given the fact that in January she told Columbia she didn't want there to be an investigation, she wouldn't cooperate and don't contact her, it is hard to see, even if it wasn't a student advocacy form, which it is, what sort of damages she could have sustained from the failure of Columbia to contact her until later in January.

Finally, your Honor, with respect to the preassault theory, I want to correct myself. I think I might have said that those cases or that the law there hinge on an allegation of general culture of indifference. That's not correct. If I said it, I'm correcting myself.

The few cases that have upheld such a theory say that they are limited to extreme situations. I am going to refer your Honor and your law clerk to cases that we cite -- of course I am very explicit about that -- to extreme cases where there is a situation where there truly is a sexually hostile culture on campus. Again, the examples are the football player ambassador program where girls were encouraged to kind of give football player recruits a good time, the situation at Baylor that led to the resignation of Kenneth Starr as president of Baylor and situations like that.

As your Honor pointed out in your exchanges with my friend, there is nothing in this complaint that comes close to those kinds of allegations about Columbia. The fact that students raised allegations is very different even in the Tubbs case where not only were there allegations, but there were filings by the DOE of these issues. SUNY said it would respond 7 and would ameliorate those findings and then it did nothing. 8 Here there has been no findings, nothing even close. You can't come close to a sexually hostile culture claim. 10

And with that, your Honor, I'm done.

THE COURT: Thank you.

I am going to get back to the papers and look at the complaint further. Hopefully I'll get you a decision in the next 30 to 60 days.

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